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Introduction
Did asset purchase programs conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) succeed in reducing the cost of corporate credit? Or did secondary market purchases merely subsidize banks' renancing cost, and thus ultimately markups? We test if and how the Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) reduced corporate loan rates after their launch in 2010. Based on a proprietary credit pricing sample provided by one of the 20 largest universal banks in the European Monetary Union, we observe corporate loan rates, which we decompose into the renancing cost paid on the internal capital market and the markup charged to individual customers. This microscopic view allows us to identify the transmission of unconventional monetary policy (UMP) via banks' internal capital markets.
A crucial challenge when attempting to quantify loan rate eects is the need to separate increased credit supply due to expansionary monetary policy, whether conventional or not, from dierences in loan demand by corporations. To test directly for pricing eects due to supply shocks, we observe whether the internal funding cost of individual loans respond signicantly to changing intensities of asset purchases over time. Internal bank capital markets generally are not often observed (cf. Cremers et al., 2011) . To our knowledge, this study is the rst to observe actual renancing rates charged internally by the treasury department to credit sales for individual loan contracts. With this information, we can test directly if UMP transmission fails or succeeds and why: because renancing rates are irresponsive or because banks do not pass on lower funding costs to their corporate customers, as might be the case when they engage in liquidity hoarding (Benmelech and Bergman, 2012; Acharya and Merrouche, 2013) and increase their own margins.
We analyze the pricing of loans granted to a sample of approximately 13,000 corporations from the so-called German "Mittelstand". These rms are customers of a large universal bank operating throughout Germany that is systemically important and included in all stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA) so far. The rms we focus on belong to the segment of small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and, thus, rely less on capital markets but more on bank nance and contribute a major share to German GDP and employment. To distinguish dierences in a rm's credit demand that might aect loan prices, potentially confounding the supply eects due to UMP, we exploit a feature of the German tax system. The authority to levy corporate taxes (Gewerbesteuer) rests with municipality councils at the regional level. Each of the approximately 2,500 municipality councils in Germany determines this multiplier autonomously for one year. These taxes generate substantial aggregate revenues of approximately EUR 35 billion in 2012, which is equal in size to value added and income tax combined. Djankov et al. (2010) show that corporate investment demand, and thus demand for credit, depends inversely on rms' tax burden. Similar to Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) , we use the spatial dispersion of scal policy to explain the cross-sectional variation in loan rates of corporate customers residing in dierent regional markets but that are exposed to an identical unorthodox monetary policy. Figure 1 shows the so-called Hebesatz, which refers to the multiplier of corporations' taxable prots determined annually by each municipality. Taxable prots provide the basis to calculate the tax burden. We show average multipliers per district (Kreise), the next higher regional level at which we observe the location of bank customers. The map clearly illustrates the dispersion of tax multipliers across customer regions. Changes to the scal stance across these localities therefore support a clear identication of loan demand stimulus due to tax policy.
Fiscal policy should be exogenous to lending terms, for several reasons. First, we analyze a proprietary sample of loans to approximately 13,000 corporate customers that already reside in regional markets, not rms that might have been attracted to a region by its favorable tax conditions. The loans we consider also are either originated or rolled over at new terms. Thus, we gauge the pricing eects of UMP and regional scal policy (RFS) for the marginal loan. The vast majority of rms in our sample also are SME that only operate in one region and are unlikely to move their headquarters easily.
With this method, we can test for the eectiveness of unorthodox monetary policy by taking a detailed view of the internal transmission of monetary policy within a major German universal bank. We use a sample that provides borrower-specic information, detailed pricing data, and risk characteristics for each of the 40,116 individual loan facilities between August 2011 and December 2013. Our identication strategy exploits exogenous credit demand shocks due to local scal policy that aects borrowers dierently across regions.
The interaction of scal policy and UMP is particularly useful for identication. Conventional monetary policy reached the zero-lower bound (ZLB), which impairs the ability of the interest rate channel to stimulate the economy.
1 Fiscal policy can then serve as an important substitute to 1 Policy rates were at a historical low of 0.05% in the European Monetary Union as of September 2014. Conventional expansionary monetary policy reduces nominal short-term rates, which reduces banks' renancing cost and conduct economic policy Billi, 2007, 2014) . 2 In light of the ZLB, central banks adopted a wide range of instruments to steer short-term nominal rates (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011) and risk premia in general .
3 Among those instruments, we focus on the outright purchase of securities in secondary markets under the SMP and the second CBPP. Prior studies, such as Manganelli (2012) and Eser and Schwaab (2015) , investigate possible price eects in bond markets and generally indicate enhanced market liquidity, lower sovereign yield spreads of EMU periphery countries, and a reduction of co-movement and jointdefault probabilities. 4 All of these factors enhance the funding conditions of banks (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2011), such as by increasing the asset value of sovereign debt and lowering the associated capital requirements, increasing the value of pledgeable collateral, and creating easier capital market access. Consequently, banks' default risk and renancing costs decrease, which should result in lower interest charged to customers.
But evidence about the real eects of these UMP measures remains scarce. Cross-country studies (Gambacorta et al., 2014) and evidence for the United States (Gilchrist et al., 2015) indicate output growth eects comparable to conventional interest rate changes. But UMP measures also have been assigned responsibility for a plethora of undesirable eects, such as liquidity hoarding (e.g. Benmelech and Bergman, 2012; Acharya and Merrouche, 2013) , risky lending (e.g. Angeloni and Faia, 2013; Jiménez et al., 2014) , regulatory arbitrage that exploits the preferential treatment of sovereign debt (e.g. Acharya and Steen, 2015) , and more generally interconnectedness among (insucient) scal discipline of politicians, (in)stability among nancial intermediaries, and monetary policy (Acharya et al., 2014) . These concerns render our identication strategy based on tax policies particularly interesting, because Correia et al. (2013) show that scal policy is well equipped to overcome the adverse implications of UMP at the ZLB, such as liquidity traps (e.g. Benmelech and Bergman, 2012; Acharya and Merrouche, 2013) . thus should improve the provision of bank credit (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Gertler, 1992, 1995; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jiménez et al., 2012). 2 For example Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) show that regionally dispersed government spending in the monetary union of the U.S. has a signicantly positive impact on aggregate output.
3 Early evidence on unconventional monetary policy in terms of exchange rate policy by Günter and Wieland (2003) highlights the limited eects of conventional monetary policy under ZLB circumstances in Japan during the mid-1990s. Iwata and Wu (2006) provide evidence, in the United States, that the eect of expansionary monetary policy at the ZLB on output is about half compared to a non-ZLB environment. Further examples of UMP measures include forward guidance (Gertler and Karadi, 2015) , targeted lending schemes, long-term lending to nancial institutions (Ferrando et al., 2015) , lenient collateral frameworks (Araújo et al., 2015) and more intensive use of government securities as collateral (Acharya and Merrouche, 2013; Fratzscher and Rieth, 2015) . 4 See, for example, Lucas et al. (2010) , Ghysels et al. (2014) , Pelizzon et al. (2015) , Falagiarda and Reitz (2015) , De Pooter et al. (2012) , Eser and Schwaab (2015) , Manganelli (2012) , and Doran et al. (2013) .
We nd that unorthodox monetary policy measures, in the form of security purchases under the SMP and the CBBP schemes, reduced renancing costs. A one standard deviation increase in the mean assets purchased reduces the average renancing costs of a loan by 5 basis points. UMP has no signicant direct eect on the interest margin and customer interest rates. But the dierential eect of expansionary unorthodox monetary policy, given a scal stimulus in the region, actually reduces customer rates and the interest margins earned by the bank. Interest hikes in response to tax-induced demand shocks thus are mitigated by a commensurate expansionary credit supply shock, embodied in an unconventional monetary policy. The scal stimulus, in terms of reduced corporate tax multipliers exerts signicantly positive eects on both customer rates and markups, as expected. Firms facing a scal stimulus in their district pay on average 0.45% more interest on their loans than rms without any or an opposite scal decision, equivalent to a markup of 16% on the average interest rate a rm pays.
We test the robustness of our ndings using dierent combinations of xed eects and an instrumental variable regression approach to scrutinize the identication of loan pricing terms due to unconventional monetary policy as opposed to eects resulting from regional dierences in loan demand. To rule out that scal policy is driven by unobserved factors, we instrument it by three factors that drive scal policy: random aggregate demand shocks due to natural disasters, elections, and regional macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, we investigate the type of unconventional monetary policy that is in place and show that our main results is not driven by alternative monetary policy measures conducted during the sample period. We add analyses regarding to which type of rms and through which loan products unconventional monetary policy transmitted.
Section 2 outlines the identication strategy we use, before we describe our data in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our results, and we conclude in Section 5.
Specication and identication

Specication
The unit of analysis in our study is monthly loans j from August 2011 to December 2013. For each rm i = 1, ..., 12, 975 located in district d = 1, ...406, we explain the variation in interest rates r per loan in product category k = 1, ..., 4 in month t = 1, ..., 29, in response to the volume of outstanding U M P measures and an indicator of regional scal stimulus RF S. This variable is equal to 1 if the district council lowered the tax multiplier relative to the preceding year. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) with xed eects and robust standard errors unless noted otherwise to estimate:
The dependent variable Y jdt abbreviates the loan's interest rate and its components, and X ijdt is a vector of rm and facility traits per period. All variables are detailed in Table 12 and we describe the sampling and the data in greater detail in Section 3.
We consider only new pricing choices by the bank, such that we include new and rolled over loans, but exclude outstanding loans, to identify the dierential eects of monetary and scal policy on corporate interest rates. Whether a new pricing choice is made on existing loans depends on the contractually determined expiration date of interest rate xation. The empirical challenge of this exercise is to separate the eects of loan demand and supply that determine loan rates.
Similar to Khwaja and Mian (2008) , De Haas and Van Horen (2013), or Ferrando et al. (2015) , we mitigate omitted variable bias and isolate the eects of regional scal policy and UMP by saturating the model with three vectors of xed eects. First, district xed eects gauge unobserved and persistent dierences across German regions (e.g., East versus West Germany) that may codetermine loan demand and rates. Second, time xed eects capture conventional monetary policy and business cycle uctuations, which inuence loan interest rates almost by construction. Third, we specify rm-product category xed eects 5 and thereby ensure a comparison of interest rates for comparable nancial products across rms that reside in dierent regions. In addition, we control for facility-(e.g., regulatory capital charges), rm-(e.g., ratings), and district (e.g., unemployment) specic variables, as we detail subsequently.
The specication thus can explain dierences in interest rates across dierent loans, per rm and loan category, in the cross-section, after accounting for time-invariant, district-specic factors that shift credit demand and for common cyclical variation over time. We test whether the remaining variation in interest rates can be attributed to the UMP as it interacts with regional dierences in loan demand shocks through scal policy. 5 The four categories are: money market loans, promotional loans (Förderkredite), investment loans, and leasing. 6
Unconventional monetary policy
We assume that loan pricing and credit provisioning did not trigger the unconventional monetary policy, which would give rise to reverse causality concerns between SMP and CBPP 2 purchases and the bank's loan supply. In response to the European sovereign debt crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) launched the SMP in May 2010 to buy sovereign bonds from ve distressed EMU countries in secondary markets: Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Manganelli, 2012; Eser and Schwaab, 2015) . In November 2011, it followed up with the CBPP 2, extending the preceding CBPP 1, which ended in June 2010, to buy covered bonds with certain criteria from primary and secondary markets.
The variable U M P in (1) refers to the outstanding volumes of securities purchased under the SM P and CBBP schemes. We obtain the data from the weekly nancial statements of the ECB. Figure 2 shows the evolution of outstanding stocks during the sample period.
Figure 2 around here
Together, both programs absorbed around 220 billion Euros, almost 3% of the Eurozone gross domestic product. Reverse causality may pose an important concern in analyses of loan market conditions and bond pricing in supported markets, (e.g., Falagiarda and Reitz, 2015; Gambacorta et al., 2014) . However, loan supply conditions in Germany, let alone those of an individual bank, are unlikely to trigger large-scale sovereign bond purchases on their own. Both programs ended de facto after the president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, announced in July 2012 that "the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough" (Draghi, 2012) . Outright monetary transactions were introduced to regulate further government bond purchases by the ECB. The last purchases under the SMP were conducted in February 2012, and under the CBPP, they lasted until October 2012. Thereafter, the outstanding volume of assets decreased gradually as bonds matured.
The bank was included in all three stress tests conducted in 2010, 2011, and 2014 by the EBA and is as such considered systemically relevant to the European banking system. These stress tests indicate existing exposures to southern European countries whose assets were the focus of the asset purchase programs that we analyze. Therefore, the bank's business choices should respond to the asset purchase programs of the ECB, either due to outright asset sales or due to asset valuation eects.
We use the time-varying magnitude of these two unconventional monetary policy measures to represent an exogenous credit supply shock to the German bank and its transmission to the cost of loans. This shock is uniform across the regions in which rms demanding credit reside. Therefore, we complement the time dimension of identication with cross-sectional dierences across rms' districts.
Regional taxes
Akin to Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) , we employ tax changes at the district level to establish the dierential treatment of rms' credit demand. Specically, we exploit regional corporate taxes (Gewerbesteuer), on which each municipality decides autonomously in each year. These taxes are an important source of regional governments' income. In 2012, municipalities received EUR 35.2 billion in corporate taxes, more than income taxes and sales taxes combined (i.e., totalling EUR 33.0 billion (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder (2014)). It is one of the ve critical taxes in Germany, which together generated 83% of national tax revenue in 2011.
Corporate taxes are set and collected at the municipality (Gemeinde) level, which is nested in the district (Kreis) level that we observe.
6 Corporate taxes are calculated on the basis of the corporations' earnings power, equivalent to revenue adjusted for certain allowances determined by local tax authorities. This calculation also provides the basis for calculating corporate taxes, that is, the product of earnings power and the corporate tax multiplier, as indicated in Figure   1 . Corporations pay corporate taxes in the municipality in which they are headquartered. If commercial units are spread across multiple municipalities, the corporate tax is split according to employees' wages. Because we observe only the location of rms' headquarters, we include the tax rate of the district in which each headquarters is located.
In setting the tax multiplier, municipalities balance their desire to attract new ventures, by oering attractive scal conditions, against foregoing too much tax revenue by setting their tax rates too low. To avoid regional beggar-thy-neighbor policies, the corporate tax multiplier is subject to a legal oor of 200%. To avoid correlation by construction, we only consider loans granted to existing client relationships that are either entirely new or rolled over at new pricing conditions.
That is, we test for the cross-sectional dierential eect in the bank's loan pricing choices between rms that are already present in the region but that demand credit under dierent scal regimes.
Like Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) we use tax changes rather than levels and measure a regional 6 We average corporate tax multipliers per district to preserve condentiality of the loan customer data. scal stimulus RF S with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the district decreased its corporate tax rate compared with the previous year. We obtain annual corporate tax rates as averages per district from Regional Database Germany Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland / Regionaldatenbank Deutschland (2014). Figure 3 shows maps of all districts to which we can allocate the banks' customers, whether the corporate tax multipliers increased, declined, or stayed constant. In summary, our identication relies on regional scal shocks that aect loan demand dierently across regions, time, and unorthodox monetary policy, which diers in intensity over time. Together these shocks permit us to identify the individual eects of each policy as well as the interplay between centralized monetary policy measures that are the zero lower bound and autonomous scal policy at the regional level for loan pricing.
Data
Sampling
We observe all corporate loans granted by one of the 20 largest universal banks in Europe between August 2011 and December 2013. The sample covers corporate SMEs with turnover greater than EUR 2.5 million. Very large rms with a yearly return of more than EUR 500 million and stock-listed corporations are excluded from our dataset. We further exclude foreign borrowers, loans denominated in a foreign currency, and nancial rms. For each rm, we observe when an individual loan is either originated anew or rolled over with new pricing terms. We cover four credit product groups: money market loans, promotional loans, investment loans, and leasing. We exclude evergreening loans and allow only xed term lending. Multiple loans within a product category in the same month are combined, such that we average the interest rates and aggregate the volumes, such as risk-based capital and the like, as we discuss subsequently. In turn, we obtain an unbalanced sample of facilities per rm and loan category. 7 Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) emphasize the asymmetric response of the corporate capital structure to tax hikes or reductions. Therefore, using robustness checks, we check for the inuence of tax hikes or the magnitude of tax changes relative to preceding levels per district. 
Interest rates
The top panel of Table 1 shows the dependent variables: charged customer interest rates, internal renancing rates, and the bank markup. On average, SMEs pay an interest rate of 2.78%.
The data permit us to decompose this customer rate into two components that gauge intra-bank UMP transmission. The interest margin is the internal spread between renancing costs and the interest rate, accounting for the borrower's risk, administrative expenses, the opportunity cost of capital, and a prot. Part of the margin covers the xed costs for the loan-providing sales unit, such as costs to run its sales force. Finally, it is at the discretion of the relationship manager to set the interest rate margin, which averages 1.89% over all facilities during the sample period.
The renancing rate is charged internally by the treasury division, which manages payment ows within the bank, balancing the asset and liability sides by ensuring sucient funding and investing excess liquidity. Loan-granting business units must pay an internal compensation for the liquidity they need to originate customer loans. This mechanism ensures the ecient transformation of maturities and cash-ow amounts within the bank. The compensation cost is determined daily and diers across loans within months. It depends on the cash-ow structure of the facility, the risk of changing interest rates over the life of the loan, and the bank-specic liquidity risk to receive the funds on the market; it averaged 87 basis points in the entire sample. Counterparties in capital markets assess the nancial institution's creditworthiness and adjust their pricing with a mark-up that remunerates them for any additional counterparty risk. Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of mean customer rates over time, as well as the relative composition of customer rates.
Figure 4 around here
Interest rates declined from about 3.7% in August 2011 to 2.6% in December 2013, remaining stable thereafter. The composition of interest rates changed considerably though. The renancing component declined continuously from about 57% to 38% over the sample period. Margins in turn soared by about 40% during the observation period. The descriptive evidence therefore indicates that monetary policy succeeded in reducing funding pressure on banks, as reected by reduced renancing costs. The transmission to corporate lending rates through banks' internal capital markets is less obvious though. Identifying whether it reects the extraction of rents due to market power or the absence of protable and adequately risky investment projects requires additional information on borrowers' demand dierences though. Therefore, we exploit regional dierences in the scal stance faced by dierent borrowers to identify which eect dominates.
In the last three columns of table 1 we show the results of performing a dierence-in-dierence test on the mean of the dependent loan pricing variables as well as our explanatory variables. The interest rate and its variable part, the interest margin, are signicantly dierent between rms which are exposed to a scal shock and those which are not. This relationship is removed after the period were asset purchase programs were mainly conducted and following the introduction of outright monetary transactions, OM T . During the latter period, facility level characteristics dier signicantly between rms. What does not dier at all, are the mean characteristics of our sample rms over time and related to scal shocks showing that it is not a change in borrower characteristics over time that leads to changes in loan pricing. Therefore, we investigate the variation in the interest rate and its components controlling for facility and rm level information with respect to U M P and RF S.
Explanatory variables
Beyond rm-credit category, district, and time xed eects, we specify additional controls to explain the three interest rates in Table 1 . We follow prior empirical studies that test theoretical models of interest margins (e.g. Ho and Saunder, 1981) , the loan in terms of the risk-weighted asset , which also gauges the regulatory capital burden of the bank. Third, we specify the duration of the loan contract in months. Fourth, an indicator variable equals 1 if the loan was originated by a standardized procedure, which is only available to customers with good ratings and for small loan sizes.
Renancing rates depend on nancial market conditions and assessments by counterparties of the bank's risk. 9 Therefore, we specify three additional variables, using market data pertaining to the day when the new loan started or the interest rate was determined for a rolled over loan.
First, we specify the price of the ve-year senior credit default swap, CDS, of the bank. Second, to capture the term structure of interest rates at the time a loan originated, we specify both short-term rates and the short-term spread , which is the dierence from a very short-term rate in nancial markets. 10
At the rm level, we specify six controls. First, the internal rating by the bank of the rm at the time that the loan was issued gauges risk. Second, beyond facility-specic risk-weighted assets, we observe the amount of capital the bank holds, relative to the total exposure with the customer per month captured, or what we call capital lockup. Third, we gauge the scale of the customer relationship, and fourth, we measure its scope. Crosssell indicates whether the customer generates prots in a product category, other than through loans, in that year. Turnover large indicates if the rm's annual sales are greater than the sample median. Fifth, we specify prof it to gauge the monthly result of the bank-rm relationship in thousands of Euro, as well as an indicator variable protable , if the result is a prot rather than a loss. Table 2 shows the results when we regress the full set of xed eects, control variables, and monetary and scal policy measures on the interest rate, interest margin, and renancing rate. purchased under the SMP and the CBPP 2 programs, respectively. The RF S indicator equals 1 if the district where a rm resides has reduced its corporate tax multiplier. Table 2 around here The rst column shows the eect on customer interest rates charged. Customers borrowing in districts that lowered their corporate taxes incurred 0.450% higher interest rates than borrowers in districts where tax rates were not reduced. We attribute this direct eect of a scal stimulus to dierences in the credit demand by SMEs, which are not explained by specic rm or credit category traits, cyclical demand factors captured by time xed eects, or regional macro dierences captured by the district xed eects. The coecient estimated for U M P is negative but not statistically dierent from zero. Larger outstanding volumes of purchased securities therefore exert no direct eect on customer loan rates. The interaction term shows, however, that unconventional monetary policy mitigates the interest rate hike in response to a scal demand-side stimulus. A one standard deviation increase in unconventional monetary measures, conditional on a stimulating scal policy shock, reduces interest rates by 0.028% 12 at the mean -a 6.2% reduction of the increase following a stimulating scal policy shock. 13 Thus, our results suggest that asset purchase programs as monetary policy instruments alone did not succeed in reducing corporate loan rates per se. But they can be eective in mitigating demand-push eects on interest rates.
Results
Main result
The second column shows evidence of a more direct channel through which monetary policy transmits to corporations' borrowing cost, namely by reducing the bank's renancing rates. For this sample, we nd indeed that the unorthodox monetary policy reduces the renancing costs for this German bank. A one standard deviation increase in assets bought under the unconventional monetary policy measures decreases the average renancing rate by 0.045%, which is an approximately 5.2% decrease from the mean. 14 This result is remarkable, in that we are documenting another eect of programs explicitly designed to alleviate funding pressure in EMU-peripheral countries; they also eased capital market conditions for nancial institutions elsewhere. As can be expected, regional scal policy in Germany had no eect on renancing conditions. The very high explanatory power of this regression illustrates, and results in Table 13 conrm, that renancing costs are almost solely determined by money market conditions, as captured by the yield curve and the term structure of the loan. In summary, whereas asset purchase programs reduced the renancing costs of banks, this supply-driven reduction did not translate into a statically signicant reduction in the interest rates passed on to SME customers through internal capital markets.
The results in column 3 for the interest margin conrm the eects documented for customer loan rates. A loan demand shock induced by scal stimulus results in a signicant increase of interest margins, on the order of 0.450%.
15 Similar to customer rates, this price push is mitigated by expansionary U M P measures. 16 The parallel eects for the interest rate and interest margin indicate that only the variable part of the interest rates is sensitive to demand shocks (e.g., through loan ocers' discretion). Table 3 shows specications with alternative xed eects and regional macro controls to assess the robustness of the identied eects of regional scal policy and unorthodox monetary policy. Table 3 around here The three panels in Table 3 contain results for ve dierent xed eect specications for each of the three interest rate components. In column (1), we specify neither district nor month xed eects, then we add month eects in column (2) and district eects in column (3), before comparing them in column (4) against the baseline specication that includes all three vectors of xed eects.
Identication
Alternative xed eects
17
Finally, we substitute district xed eects with regional macro variables at the district level in column (5). We observe the district's unemployment rate, level of gross domestic product, level of corporate tax rate, and debt level in the year the loan is issued, as well as the total loan volume the bank issued in the district in the respective week, for about 90% of rms in our sample.
15 The results are robust to using clustered standard errors instead of robust standard errors, which we use in all of our analysis if not indicated otherwise.
16 Analysing the ow of asset purchase programs under SMP and CBPP instead of the cumulative amount of asset purchases shows no signicant eects on loan pricing. The is potentially due to the heterogenous distribution of ows over time, that is a few large amounts bought at the beginning of the programms and some smaller amounts in the following weeks.
17 We also specied time-district xed eects in addition to rm-product xed eects to control for variation within districts and between districts over time. This analysis conrms that U M P has a signicantly negative eect on the renancing rate.
For the interest rate charged to customers, the results demonstrate the need to control for the cyclical eects of monetary policy. Failing to specify month xed eects falsely assigns security purchases a loan price increasing eect. The reduction of renancing costs also is estimated with bias when omitting these month-specic eects. Adding regional macro covariates leaves all of our main results intact. Moreover, the results alleviate the endogeneity-related concern that scal policy is not orthogonal to monetary policy. This might be the case if the decision to change taxes is inuenced by municipalities being owners of local savings banks which are hit by the 2008 nancial crisis through their head institution (see Puri et al., 2011) . Then RF S would not measure changes in demand but aectedness of municipalities by the nancial crisis. Our results hold when we include the district's debt level, which alleviates the concern that districts are indebted because of regional savings banks' distress and systematically choose their scal policy regarding corporate taxation.
18 Table 3 shows that our results are robust to current debt levels of thee districts.
However, unreported tests indicate a dependency of RF S on lagged macroeconomic indicators, leading us to further robustness tests using intruments in the following section. Overall, our model saturated with xed eects provides conservative estimates of the possible eects of regional scal policy and a common unconventional monetary policy.
Instrumental variable estimation
We use changes in scal policy as an exogenous shock to rms inuencing their demand for loans. Therefore, we need to ensure that it is indeed the change in the corporate tax rate that aects loan demand instead of other unobserved factors that drives the change in corporate taxes. Figure 3 indicates substantial spatial dispersion of tax rates over time. And gure 5 conrms that next to average tax rates, mean macroeconomic conditions as well as average lending activity varies considerably at the regional level.
Figure 5 around here
West German districts exhibit high levels of corporate taxes whereas average regional output growth is more dispersed. Likewise, average loan growth is dispersed with higher mean levels in the more prosperous western regions.
Thus, the specication of regional debt and output conditions shown in Table 3 is indeed important to alleviate possible ommitted variable bias. But it is insucient to rule out that lower 18 Including the district specic Lerner index as a measure of local banking competition conrms our results. corporate tax rates as scal stimulus are the result rather than the cause of loan demand shifts.
Therefore, we conduct a two-stage least-squares estimation and instrument the RF S by three variables that explain changes in corporate taxes well, but are arguably weakly correlated with the corporate demand for credit. First, Foremny and Riedel (2014) show that German corporate taxes are determined at the regional level systemically dierent dependent on whether an election is held in the municipality in question. They show that in the run-up to regional elections, tax rates are signicantly more likely to be reduced. Therefore, we manually collect election results at the regional level, so called Gemeindewahlen , from state statistical oces and public sources and specify an indicator equal to one if there is a regional election in the district in the respective year.
Second, in the spirit of, for example, Lambert et al. (2012) , we use natural disasters as a random aggregate demand shock. These aggregate shocks often trigger public policy in terms of spending, tax cuts, or a combination of both. Extreme weather conditions represent unanticipated shocks that can occur within narrow regional connements, for instance the banks of ooding rivers.
The economic damage clearly depends not only on meteorological intensity of disasters, such as hailstorms or oods, but also on the economic damage inicted. Therefore, we source data from the annual Natural Hazard Reports (Naturgefahrenreport ) provided by the German Association of Insurances. The report indicates the monetary damage covered by insurances due to storm, hail, and ooding at the district level.
19 The variable damages by storm is an integer ranging between 1 and 9, where larger numbers indicate higher severity.
Third, we use the rate of unemployment as an indicator of the district's economic well-being as an instrument. The main determinant of local tax policies is indeed to stimulate economically weaker regions and, in particular, employment. Since we are considering corporate loan demand, we therefore argue that unemployment should correlate well with tax policy of the local politicians, but is suciently weakly correlated with loan demand and thus prices, which we explain. as well as jointly. Both regional elections as well as storm damages increase the likelihood of a 19 See, for example, www.gdv.de. We are grateful for the provision of these data by the GDV. scal stimulus in the form of reduced corporate tax rates. Higher unemployment, in turn, reduces the likelihood of tax reductions. This result indicates that adverse economic conditions in certain regions' labor market might be tackled more likely with direct transfer payments rather than corporate tax cuts, which would further burden public nances.
For our purposes, we are more interested whether the instruments fulll the necessary requirements, that is, whether they explain scal stimuli well but are uncorrelated with the three outcome variables. According tests for weak and overidentication are shown as well where applicable. All three instruments are jointly signicant to explain RF S well as demonstrated by the F-statistic that accounts for clustered standard errors. Likewise, the Hansen-J statistic strongly supports the (statistical) validity of our instruments as well.
Panels A through C depict the second stage regression results for the three dierent interest rates using the instrumented scal policy shock, IRF S. Using the preferred specication of jointly specifying all three instruments conrms all our main ndings. Customer interest rates increase in response to scal stimuli, an eect that is mitigated by expansionary U M P . The instrumented regional scal shock, IRF S, also has a positive eect on the interest margin. Likewise, the renancing cost of the bank decline in direct response to an expansion of U M P . Interestingly, when instrumenting RF S, the positive direct term of U M P on interest margins is now contrary to the baseline also signicantly dierent from zero.
This last result suggests that unusual expansionary monetary policy measures launched by the ECB in support of EMU periphery countries' sovereign yields not only beneted banks in terms of renancing cost. It also provided banks with a signicantly larger economic rent they earned.
Multi-region and multi-rm enterprises
As an additional check whether we identify loan demand, we exploit the feature that not all corporations in our sample are standalone enterprises. A few borrowers belong, however, to multirm enterprises with operations in dierent German districts. Those rms are not only exposed to scal policy in the region where they are headquartered, but indirectly also by policy in districts where connected rms are located, for instance through changes in demand in internal capital markets. We therefore compare rms in districts without any scal policy shock that have at least one connected rm in a dierent district exposed to a stimulating scal policy shock against standalone rms in the same district. This comparison is relevant for the contagion eects of demand shocks, and it also provides a test in which scal policy in a distant district arguably should be orthogonal to rms' credit demand. Table 5 around here Instead of RF S, we use an indicator equal to the number of aliated rms in a foreign district experiencing a stimulating scal policy shock, F RF S. Table 5 shows that rms are aected by scal policy shocks that do not occur in their own district but districts of their aliates. Those rms pay a higher average interest rate on their loans than standalone rms. Unconventional monetary policy also has a diminishing eect on the interest rate in interaction with scal policy and reduces the renancing component of the interest rate. We nd the same direction of eects with respect to the interest margin. Although these ndings move in the same direction as the eects derived from our main results, they are not signicant. This lack of signicance likely reects the substantially smaller sample size, because we include only those districts without any regional scal policy change. In addition to conrming our main results, this nding supports our assumption that regional scal policy shocks are exogenous to a rm's credit demand, because the eect is in the same direction working through dierent rms' common internal capital market across districts. 4.3. Type and timing of unconventional monetary policy 4.3.1. Separating asset purchase programs Thus far, we have looked at the aggregate of unconventional monetary policy measures. In Table 6 , we distinguish between the cumulative amount of assets bought under the Securities Markets Programme, SM P , and the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 2, CBP P . The separate specication of both programs shows that most of the eects we nd to be statistically signicant are driven by the SM P program. Whereas we nd neither direct nor interaction eects from CBP P , the SM P conrms the baseline eects reported earlier. Customer interest rates in column (1) exhibit the same direct and interaction eects of scal and monetary policy measures as before. The demand stimulating scal shock, in combination with increasing interest rates and the interest rate decreasing eect of the SM P , also persist in the joint specication with CBP P in column (3).
The SM P has a signicantly decreasing eect on the renancing rate, both when specied separately and jointly with CBP P . The interest rate shifting eect of scal policy remains evident in this conguration. The results for the interest margin mimic those for the customer interest rate, as shown in the rightmost panel of table 6. Regarding customer interest rates, the eect of the CBP P remains statistically insignicant throughout.
We conclude that the substantially larger SM P had the signicant eect on loan pricing as opposed to the smaller CBP P .
Asset purchase programs vs. additional lending facilities to banks
In addition to these unconventional measures, longer-term renancing operations (LT RO) permitted banks to lend money at xed terms for a xed time from the ECB. Those measures, taken during the European sovereign debt crisis, also sought to foster lending and stabilize banking operations. We test for the bank's monthly usage of LT RO in addition to U M P to determine whether part of the eects we nd are caused by LT RO. Table 7 shows the results for all interest variables and the dierent specications we test. We add LT RO as an explanatory variable into our baseline regression and interact it with both U M P and RF S. The results are in column (2), next to our baseline results in column (1). We nd a negative but insignicant eect of LT RO on any variable of interest, interest rate, renancing rate, and interest margin. Nevertheless, when specifying U M P together with LT RO, our baseline ndings hold. The U M P has a signicant negative eect on the renancing rate and a reducing eect on interest rates and interest margins in interaction with scal policy. A demand-stimulating scal policy shock increases interest rates and the interest margins. Thus, our baseline results are conrmed, albeit with lower signicance. Evidence from this analysis suggests it is not LT RO that drives the eect but U M P .
The asset purchase programs in particular targeted assets from EMU periphery countries:
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. Therefore, the eects we look at should be sensitive to the amount of respective assets the bank holds in its portfolio. We collect this information from quarterly balance sheet reports and weight the amount of U M P with the ratio of assets from periphery countries over total assets. As reported in column (3), the eects remain intact and signicant when we use U M P _P A instead of U M P .
Thus, unconventional asset purchase programs had an eect on credit pricing above and beyond additional liquidity provision schemes, such as LT RO.
Words or deeds: Draghi's London speech
According to Ferrando et al. (2015) , the speech by ECB President Mario Draghi in London in August 2012 was a hallmark in restoring faith with nancial markets participants. Table 8 shows the estimation results when we divide the sample into subsamples, before and after this speech. Table 8 The eects for the three interest rates persist in the period after August 2012. Fiscal policy that stimulated credit demand increased both customer interest rates and the margins earned by the bank, and U M P mitigated this eect. The direct eect of the latter policy on reducing renancing rates also was signicant after the Draghi speech, though at a lower level of signicance, which may reect the reduced power of our tests given a smaller sample. A reduced sample size may also explain why we nd mostly consistent coecients prior to August 2012, which are however insignicant. An exception is the large positive coecient estimated for the direct U M P eect on margins prior to August 2012.
Firm heterogeneity
Financially constrained rms
Firms that are nancially constrained might behave dierently with respect to loan demand and experience dierences in loan pricing. To control for rm heterogeneity with respect to credit constraints, we investigate balance sheet information of the rms. The bank collects the balance sheet data, because rms must report this information during the loan granting process and for monitoring activities. Yet we do not have balance sheet information for all rms, so we avoid using the balance sheet information explicitly as explanatory variables in our main regressions.
Nevertheless, this information is incorporated indirectly through the rm's rating, which takes into account a nancial analysis of the rm. We use the balance sheet data to test the eect of rms' cash-ow, which Almeida and Campello (2007) propose as an indicator of constraint, on loan pricing. We also use the balance sheet data to divide rms into those that are most versus least constrained, to determine if this drives our main results with respect to the interest rate. Table 9 shows our ndings. Table 9 around here For nearly 60% of rms, we observe their gross cash-ow rate. Column (2) shows our baseline result, with cash-ow over total assets as an additional explanatory variable. Cash-ow signicantly reduces the interest rate paid by a rm. Although rms that rely more on cash are supposed to be constrained in their nancing, more cash at hand reduces the cost of nancing. By interacting cash-ow with monetary and scal policy, we nd that in interaction with an U M P more cash-ow increases the interest paid. In other words, the more nancially constrained rms are, the more they pay interest for their loan, given that an U M P is in place. Our baseline ndings hold in this specication.
In columns (3)-(6), we divide rms into the most and least nancially constrained, using two measures. The rst is the indicator proposed by Whited and Wu (2006) . Although we nd a negative relationship between cash-ow and the interest rate for unconstrained rms and a positive one for constrained rms, suggesting that cash-ow is valued positively by rms with nancing alternatives, these results are not signicant. The lack of data for all rms might drive this phenomenon. Our baseline ndings hold for rms classied as nancially unconstrained. In our opinion, this indication suggests that unconstrained rms are more sensitive in their investment behavior following a regional scal stimulus than are nancially constrained rms. This nding holds if we use rms' average asset size between 2011 and 2013 as a measure of constrainedness.
We classify the lowest tercile of rms as those that are most constrained, due to their greater opacity and higher informational asymmetries between the rm and the bank. The largest rms are classied as the least constrained. Our baseline ndings hold for the latter type of rms, for which we also nd a signicant negative relationship between cash-ow and pricing. However, having U M P in place counteracts the reducing eect of cash-ow and increases the interest rate signicantly.
Overall, nancial constraint matters for loan pricing and U M P reduces the interest rates in particular for unconstrained rms.
Customer segments: size, rm age, relationship duration
A further dimension we investigate in unreported test concerns customer heterogeneity. The bank segments customers into small, medium, and large SMEs. Small customers tend to be dierent due to their high degree of opacity. We test whether the eects of the U M P and regional scal stimulus dier in subsamples comprised of distinct customer segments. We conrm the baseline eects on loan pricing for medium and large customers. It may be that larger rms are more sensitive to changes in corporate taxes and react to stimulating events by increasing investments, whereas small rms' investment demand is more inelastic with respect to scal policy.
Next, we distinguish borrowers according to their age. We use the 25th and 75th percentiles of the age distribution as our reference points to dierentiate young, medium, and old rm samples.
Stimulating scal shocks go along with an increase in interest rates only for young and old rms.
For those rms, we also nd a signicant interaction eect of monetary and scal policy. Thus, our results indicate that rms dier with respect to their sensitivity to scal policy changes if they belong to one of the extremes of the age distribution for rms.
Finally, we explore subsamples according to the length of the bank-customer relationship. We use again the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of the variable "length of customer relationship" to build subsamples of short, medium, and long relationships. By and large, we nd no signicant eects across these subsamples.
Loan product peculiarities
New lending versus extensions at dierent terms
Monetary and scal policy shocks should only aect new credit decisions, not outstanding stocks of loans. Whereas in general we consider only those loans that feature new conditions, we further separate loans that are completely new business from rolled-over credit with existing customers at new conditions in Table 10 . Table 10 around here   As Table 10 shows, the eect of monetary and scal policy on the interest rate is the same, regardless of whether it is a new or prolonged loan. The same nding occurs with respect to the interest margin, in that a stimulating scal policy has an increasing eect on the interest rate, and the interaction with the U M P acts to alleviate higher interest rates. Unconventional monetary policy reduces renancing costs only for new loans. One reason might be that the renancing conditions are xed for a longer period than the interest margin, so the renancing rate of prolonged loans is not sensitive to current market conditions.
Credit product categories
The sample of loans we observed can be divided into four dierent loan categories. Money market loans have a maturity of at most one year and a xed interest rate. They tend to be used to nance working capital. Promotional bank loans are originated by a government or supranational institution, such as development banks, which cover the renancing for commercial banks that distribute these loans to their corporate customers, provide advice, and determine the complete credit pricing. Next, investment loans have medium or long durations. Finally, we observe leasing.
The latter three credit categories are of a longer-term nature and therefore tend to nance investments. Given their dierent nature and maturity, we investigate in Table 11 whether dierent loan categories, depicted in panel A through D, respond dierently to scal and monetary policy. We apply our baseline identication to each of the loan categories to identify whether dierent loan products are aected dierently. The eect of stimulating scal policy and its interaction with unconventional monetary policy measures on loan pricing is driven by the largest group of money market loans. However, the eect on the renancing rate turns insignicant. For the remaining three categories, we estimate coecients that exhibit, for the most part, similar directions to those we uncovered in the baseline model, though they are not statistically discernible from zero.
From these ndings, we conclude that especially short-term loans that suit the funding demand for working capital are signicantly sensitive to positive scal policy shocks and parallel scal and monetary policy shocks.
Conclusion
We use a proprietary loan pricing data set from a large bank in Germany to analyze the intrabank transmission of unconventional monetary policy (U M P ). For a sample of 40,116 observed loans to corporate borrowers, we test the eect of security purchases by the European Central Bank, under the Security Markets Program and the Covered Bonds Purchase Program, on customer interest rates, interest margins earned by the bank, and renancing rates between August 2011 and December 2013.
To identify the eects of the enhanced credit supply due to U M P , we rely on the regional corporate tax shocks to which individual rms are exposed. These scal shocks control for demand, thereby creating a quasi-experimental setting where we can identify how a euro area wide monetary policy, set at the European level, interacts with local scal policy that is determined autonomously at the district level.
Security purchases by the ECB reduced the funding cost of banks signicantly. But we nd no direct eect of unconventional monetary policy on a borrower's loan interest rate or margins earned by the bank. Thus, expansionary monetary policy aimed to alleviate funding pressure in particular on sovereign debt of the periphery of Eurozone members did not reduce overall cost of credit in other parts of the Eurozone.
Regarding regional scal policy, we nd that customers that reside in districts that lowered their corporate tax rates pay approximately 0.45% higher loan rates, consistent with greater loan demand in response to a scal stimulus. This result indicates that a decentralized scal policy, for instance in an attempt to stimulate aggregate demand and economic growth, might spark interest rates hikes. But the interaction between scal and monetary policy has a negative eect on the interest rates paid by corporate customers and the interest margins earned by the bank. Credit cost hikes due to scal impulses can thus be accommodated by an expansionary unconventional monetary policy. The overall eect on loan rates paid by our sample of German rms that dependent on bank-nance is in fact negative.
Our results are robust to the identication of loan demand with an instrumental variable approach and also remain intact also after controlling for alternative long-term liquidity provisioning by the ECB and the actual exposure of the bank to sovereign debt in the periphery of the Eurozone.
The much larger security market purchase program drives the estimated eect whereas the much smaller (second) covered bonds purchase program exhibits limited eects. We conclude that large sizeable purchase programs might be needed to exert signicant eects on loan terms. In addition, we nd that the eects are most pronounced after the speech of the ECB's president corroborating the commitment of the central bank to do whatever it takes to restore faith in the currency. This result underpins that words remain at least as important as deeds in easing credit terms in the Eurozone. Notes: The quantiles for the levels of the tax multipliers, the corporate tax level, are as follows: 2011: 246343-364-410-445-490; 2012: 237-344-365-410-450-520 and for 2013: 223-344-365-410-450-520 . This table reports the number of observations, means, standard deviations and values at the 1st and 99th percentiles for all observed loans in the period between August 2011 and December 2013. For the variables of interest, the interest rate and its components, as well as the variables which explain the interest rate and its components as control variables we report the dierence in means between rms treated by a regional scal policy shock, RF S, and those which experience no shock before and after outright monetary transactions, OM T , were announced. The last column reports the dierence-in-dierences of the means of both treatment groups over time. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix A Figures
Variable
Observations Unconventional monetary policy, regional scal policy shocks, and loan pricing Notes: We regress the interest rate, the renancing rate, and the interest margin on the full set of variables in Table 13 , an indicator for a stimulating regional scal policy shock RF S, the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P , and the interaction eect of the two. We apply an ordinary least squares regression with xed eects for the rm-product combination, month, Alternative xed eects, regional controls, and interest rates Notes: We regress the interest rate and each of its components on the full set of explanatory variables in Table 13 , an for a stimulating regional scal policy shock RF S, the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P , and the interaction eect of the two latter policy variables. We apply an ordinary least squares regression with dierent combinations of xed eects (1)-(4), each including robust standard errors. Column (4) reports our baseline results derived by the same specications as in Table 2 . In column (5) we replace district xed eects with macro-level control variables for each district. The analysis incorporates all loans between August 2011 and December 2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
(3) (4)
(1)
(3) (4) We instrument a stimulating regional scal policy shock RF S by applying a two-stage least-squares estimation. We regress the RF S on three exogenous regressors election, damages by storm, and unemployment separately in columns (1)-(3) and jointly in column (4). In the following panels A, B, and C we regress the interest rate, the renancing rate, and the interest margin on the full set of variables in Table 13 , the instrumented stimulating regional scal policy shock IRF S, the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P , and the interaction eect the non-instrumented RF S and U M P . Unconventional monetary policy and scal policy shock eects through multi-region and multi-rm enterprises Notes: We regress the interest rate, the renancing rate, and the interest margin on the full set of variables in Table 13 , an indicator for a stimulating foreign regional scal policy shock F RF S, the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P , and the interaction eect of the two. F RF S equals the number of rms located in a dierent district that face a stimulating regional scal policy shock for rms that belong to an enterprise owning at least one other rm. We apply an ordinary least squares regression with xed eects for the rm-product combination, month, and district, including robust standard errors. The analysis incorporates only loans to rms in districts in which the corporate tax rate is stable between August 2011 and December 2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
VARIABLES
Interest Asset purchase programms as measures of unconventional monetary policy Note: To separate the eects of dierent UMP measures, we regress our baseline formula in equation (1) on the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P but also separately for the SM P and CBP P , stimulating regional scal policy shocks RF S, its interaction, and, full set of control variables in Table 13 . We apply an ordinary least squares regression with xed eects for the rm-product combination, month, and district, including robust standard errors. The analysis incorporates all loans between August 2011 and December 2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. VARIABLES
Interest rate
Renancing rate
Interest margin
(2)
(2) Asset purchase programms vs. long-term renancing operations Notes: We regress the interest rate, renancing rate, and interest margin on the full set of variables in Table 13 , an indicator for a stimulating regional scal policy shock RF S, and multiple monetary policy variables and their interaction: the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P , the monthly usage of LT RO, and U M P weighted by the bank's ratio of asset holdings from PIGGS countries over total assets (_P A), and its interaction eect. We apply an ordinary least squares regression with xed eects for the rm-product combination, month, and district, including robust standard errors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. VARIABLES
Interest margin (1) (2)
(2) Table 13 , an indicator for a stimulating regional scal policy shock RF S, the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P and the interaction eect of the two latter policy variables. We apply an ordinary least squares regression with xed eects for the rm-product combination, month, and district, including robust standard errors. The analysis incorporates all loans between August 2011 and December 2013.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Table 13 , an indicator for a stimulating regional scal policy shock RF S, the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P , and the interaction eect of the two. Moreover, we add CF , or each rms' gross cash ow over total assets, as an explanatory variable. The rst column corresponds to our baseline nding, as in Table 2 . In column (2) the explanatory variable CF is added. The subsequent columns report results for subsamples according to whether rms are more or less nancially constrained. Column (3)-(4) show the results for the lowest and highest tertiles of rms with respect to the Whited Wu indicator, and columns (5)-(6) reveal the results for the lowest and highest tertiles of rms with respect to their average asset size between 2011 and 2013. We apply an ordinary least squares regression with xed eects for the rm-product combination, month, and district, including robust standard errors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
( Table 13 , an indicator for a stimulating regional scal policy shock RF S, the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P , and the interaction eect of the two latter policy variables. We apply an ordinary least squares regression with xed eects for the rm-product combina- The eect of unconventional monetary policy and scal policy shocks on loan pricing for dierent loan product categories Note: We perform our baseline regression for each loan product category separately. The interest rate and each of its components are regressed on the full set of explanatory variables in Table   13 , an indicator for a stimulating regional scal policy shock RF S, the accumulated stock of unconventional monetary policy U M P , and the interaction eect of the two latter policy variables.
We apply an ordinary least squares regression with xed eects for rms, months, and districts, including robust standard errors. We performed the analysis separately for the subsamples of money market loans, promotional bank loans, investment loans, and leasing between August 2011 and December 2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
VARIABLES
Interest Standardized 0/1 Equal to 1 if the loan was processed in a dened simplied manner, and 0 otherwise.
Short-term rate Percent
Level of the short-term interbank interest rate at the time the loan starts.
Short-term spread Percent
Dierence between the short-term rate and veryshort-term rate at the time the loan starts.
CDS Percent
Five-year senior credit default swap rate of the respective nancial institution observed. 
Firm level i controls
CF Number
Ratio of gross cash ow over total capital stock at the beginning of the period, less depreciation.
Continued on next page. . . Fiscal policy stance per district RFS 0/1 Regional scal stimulus: equal to 1 if corporate tax rate in the district the company is located in is lower than in previous year and 0 if similar or higher.
RFD 0/1 Regional scal dampening: equal to 1 if corporate tax rate in the district the company is located in is higher than in previous year and 0 if similar or lower.
RTC Percent
Relative tax change: dierence between this and last
year's corporate tax rate divided by last year's corporate tax rate for each district (1=100%).
Corporate tax level Percent
Level of corporate tax rate for the respective district in the respective year (1=100%).
FRFS Number
Equal to the number of rms located in a dierent district facing a stimulating regional scal policy shock for rms that belong to an enterprise owning at least one other rm, and 0 otherwise. 
